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The price of a barrel of Brent has risen markedly to date this year. 
Specifically, from end-2018 to late April 2019, the oil price climbed 
40%, to $75, the highest price for this commodity since October 
2018 (that said, there has been a sharp decline subsequently) (see 
Chart 1). As this box sets out, the price rise seen in the first four 
months of the year is chiefly associated with various supply-side 
factors, including the recent cuts in production by OPEC and its 
partners, the US sanctions on Iran and the abrupt decline in 
Venezuelan output (see Chart 2). 
Moreover, dearer crude between January and April may also have 
been partly in response to demand-side factors, insofar as it has 
been accompanied by a perception of some improvement in 
global activity. Initially, economic developments proved somewhat 
more favourable than expected at the start of the year. But the 
recent heightening of trade tensions has reignited doubts over the 
strength of global demand, which may have contributed to the fall 
in oil prices observed over the course of May. 
This box describes in detail the supply-side factors behind dearer 
crude in 2019 to date, and provides a quantification of the 
sensitivity of oil prices to shocks of this nature. One fundamental 
supply element when it comes to explaining price developments is 
the production strategy of OPEC and its partners (OPEC+). Last 
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SOURCES: International Energy Agency, Bloomberg, IFS and own calculations.
a Supply projections calculated having regard to constant OPEC production.
b Q4 over Q4, except 2019: April over December.
The price of a barrel of Brent has increased considerably in 2019. This rise is associated with the production cuts by OPEC+, with the US sanctions on 
Iran and with the sharp fall in Venezuelan output. The heightening of trade tensions in the recent period extends the doubts over the weakness of the 
global demand for oil.
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BOX 1 THE DETERMINANTS OF RECENT OIL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (cont’d)
December, OPEC+ agreed to cut crude oil extraction by 1.2 million 
barrels a day (mb/d), accounting for 1.2% of the global oil supply. 
This was an attempt to re-balance the market, after the rising trend 
in inventories and the decline in prices observed in the second half 
of 2018. Under the terms agreed, the OPEC countries’ contribution 
to the cut would be 0.8 mb/d, and that of the non-OPEC members, 
0.4 mb/d.1 The aim of the agreement was to try and set a floor to 
the price per barrel of around $60 dollars. On data to April, the 
reduction in output is estimated to have exceeded the 0.4 mb/d 
agreed upon (see Chart 3).2 At its forthcoming meeting in June, 
OPEC+ will have to decide, in view of market developments, 
whether it maintains the cuts and their size. 
Another key factor behind the price rise is the resumption of US 
sanctions on Iran. These include, in particular, a halt in oil 
purchases from Iran.3 As a result of the sanctions, Iranian oil 
production has dipped by almost one-third to 2.6 mb/d and might 
fall to a greater extent in the coming months (see Chart 3). 
The third factor bearing on supply is the collapse of oil production 
in Venezuela.4 True, Venezuelan crude oil production has been 
falling for almost two decades. But the decline has become more 
pronounced in the past three years, from 2.3 mb/d in January 2016 
to 0.8 mb/d in April 2019 (see Chart 3). This slump has been in an 
environment of strong political tensions and a fresh round of US 
sanctions. In perspective, the factors behind this development 
would be related to the secular decline in investment and to the 
shortcomings in the management of firms in the sector. Looking 
ahead, against the backdrop of the difficult political context, the 
outlook is negative. That is due to financial difficulties and to the 
US sanctions, both of which factors prevent the necessary inputs 
being imported to maintain production and to check the 
progressive deterioration in the network of pipelines and 
infrastructure needed for extraction.
To assess the impact on crude prices of a worsening in the 
situation in Iran or Venezuela, a series of simulations have been 
performed with a set of ten alternative models. These consider 
different specifications of the price of a barrel of Brent in real terms 
based on a series of variables (world crude production, various 
indicators of global economic activity – as a proxy for demand – 
and oil inventories of the OECD countries).5 The simulations show 
that a permanent unanticipated shock, consisting of a reduction in 
supply of 1 mb/d, would have an upward impact on the Brent 
per-barrel price of between $6 and $24, with the average effect 
around $15 dollars (Chart 4).
Against this background, if global demand for oil were to trend in 
line with International Energy Agency (IEA) projections, which were 
made before the recent rise in trade tensions, the market could 
tighten again in the short term. There could be possible upward 
risks to crude prices if the supply-side shocks described were to 
increase. However, in the medium term several factors can cap the 
rise in prices. First, OPEC and Russia might react with increases in 
their production to this hypothetical scenario of additional price 
rises. Hence, the Saudi authorities have suggested they might use 
a portion of their spare production capacity (some 2.2 mb/d) to 
accommodate supply. Moreover, the limited fiscal leeway of some 
of the OPEC+ members will foreseeably contribute to encouraging 
increases in production (although given their downward impact on 
prices, it is not obvious they will achieve their revenue-raising 
objective). Lastly, shale-oil production in the United States will 
continue growing, which might consolidate this country’s position 
this year as the leading global oil producer and turn it into a net oil 
exporter.6
In sum, there are arguments that the increase in prices observed 
until end-April might conceivably respond to supply fluctuations. 
In the medium term, it is likely that several of the producer 
countries signatory to the agreement to cut output may not wish it 
to hold over time. And this, along with the supply of shale oil in the 
United States, would tend to restrict the rise in crude prices, at the 
expense of the evolution of demand. In any case, the upcoming 
IEA forecasts may portray a less favourable demand scenario, 
reflecting the forces that appear to have characterised recent oil 
market developments. That would add a downward risk to the 
price of this commodity.1  In any event, Iran, Venezuela and Libya were exempt from production 
cuts.
2  In particular, Saudi Arabia’s production has been 0.5 mb/d below its 
assigned target, while Russia, conversely, showed a compliance rate of 
only 80%. 
3  Iran has the fourth biggest reserves in the world after Venezuela, Saudi 
Arabia and Canada. Whereas before the Iranian revolution in 1979 
production rose to 6 mb/d, it subsequently fell drastically, recovering 
partly only after the lifting of the embargo in 2015, to 3.8 mb/d at the 
start of 2018, 4% of global supply. In principle, it was expected that the 
entry into force of the sanctions on oil purchases would be in November 
2018. However, the US administration introduced exemptions, which 
expired in early May.
4  Venezuela, according to its authorities, has the biggest crude oil reserves 
in the world, some 300 billion barrels of heavy crude. However, much of 
these reserves have very high production costs. According to alternative 
sources, Venezuela’s economically viable oil resources with per-barrel 
prices of $50 would only amount to 75 billion barrels.
5  These models use a Bayesian Structural VAR (BVAR) methodology with 
sign restrictions. The identification used allows a distinction to be drawn 
between supply shocks, global demand, speculative demand and 
idiosyncratic oil demand factors. In any event, it should be pointed out 
that the modelling of oil prices is not trivial, as academic debate shows, 
and the conclusions may change significantly depending on the model 
used.
6  Admittedly, however, other factors would tend to limit the downward 
pressures on prices. Firstly, there are doubts in the market about Saudi 
Arabia’s capacity to expand its output in a sustained manner, and about 
the possibility of OPEC replacing the crude oil varieties produced by Iran 
and Venezuela. Secondly, shale-oil extraction in the United States is 
highly sensitive to prices; thus, if prices fall that would translate into 
output reductions.
